Answering a task is also influenced by cognitive biases. An example is the familiarity bias. The people we see most often are very familiar to us and also perceived as more beautiful (i.e., our own children, parents, spouse) (Peskin & Newell, 2004) . Instead of familiarity, the RMET has been analyzed for bias based on the valence of the stimuli. In the meta-analysis of Richman and Unoka (2015) , people with major depression had a lower overall accuracy score, mainly driven by errors on positive items (positive valence). This takeaway is in agreement with other behavioral tasks finding a negativity bias or absence of a positivity bias in people with depression (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010) .
Given the inconsistent results on emotion recognition tasks ( Harms et al., 2010) , we set out to modify the RMET to assess performance and bias along the autism continuum. We expected a stronger discrepancy between the groups by selecting new emotional expressions through an iterative process among humans who varied in the amount of their autistic traits. Further, instead of using a performance benchmark (correct/incorrect), we provide a different scoring validated on over 2,000 people. This scoring classifies responses as either more autistic/neurodiverse (see below) or more neurotypical-like. This score is a bias measure.
Method
Over 10,000 persons participated in four online surveys hosted at (i.e., no IP address was registered). Participants were informed about the objectives of the study, and informed consent was obtained from all participants before taking the test. Research items in the Aspie Quiz could be skipped by selecting the "?" alternative (checked by default).
Materials
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RMET). Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001a) presented students a selection of cropped faces showing mainly the region around the eyes and displaying various mental states, which they termed the "Reading the Mind in the Eyes test" (RMET). Through an iterative process, they kept those "eyes" that had a clear preferred emotional expression (i.e., over twice as many answers than the other three mental state descriptors received). It is important to stress that the expression seen on the pictures had no correct answer per se. After that, the authors presented this stimulus set to a naïve group of students and adults who were diagnosed with Asperger syndrome. The latter group showed a larger spread in their answers and they less often agreed on the option the student population had agreed upon. We build on this iterative process for selecting better mental state descriptors. The primary factor in Aspie Quiz was named neurodiversity factor, and the secondary factor was named neurotypical factor. The neurodiversity factor measures autistic traits whereas the neurotypical factor measures non-autistic traits. For classification of a person into neurotypical and/or neurodiverse, we used the difference between these two scores. A participant with a score difference above or equal to 35 was classified as neurodiverse (ND) (i.e., the autistic-like traits prevail), and someone with a score difference below or equal to 35 was classified as neurotypical (NT).
Scores in between were classified as mixed. The cutoff was set to 35 in the investigation phase (Ekblad, 2013) confirming 80% of 1 6/19 diagnosed AS/HFA/PDD.
Procedure
The RMET was presented before proceeding to the Aspie Quiz items. This order prevented any bias in performing the task due to one's score along the neurodiverse/neurotypical continuum.
The optimization of the RMET was done in several steps. In the first step, the test was run with the four original emotions from the RMET and an "I don't know" alternative (final version 2; H9, 2013). In the next step, an attempt was made to find the emotions that could best differentiate the neurodiverse and the neurotypical populations from each other. Emotions were collected from previous research in the Aspie Quiz about stims (Pfuhl & Ekblad, 2017) and also included all the original choices, resulting in a list of 85 emotions. First, all the 85 emotions were selectable (final version 2; H10, 2013). Then, 16 emotions, 10 emotions, six emotions, and four emotions (final version 2; H11-H14, 2013) were selected based on which had the largest difference between the populations. The idea was to make the transition to fewer alternatives more gradual so as not to miss out too early on an emotion when alternatives were reduced.
Subjects also had the option to respond with "I don't know."
Data analysis
Participants who answered less than 10 items were excluded. We used multinomial logistic regression on the original RMET (Tables 2   and 3 in Appendix), the six alternatives version (Table 4 in Appendix), and the new four alternatives version (Table 5 in Appendix). The ND/NT score was the sole predictor. The factors age and gender were not included in the regression models since they were not of primary interest. We also grouped people based on diagnosis and their ND/NT score for comparison with previous studies. The rate of decline was calculated based on the percentage of "I don't know" responses for each eye expression. Statistical significance is reported with Bonferroni-Holm corrected p-values.
Scores for the RMET were calculated in two ways. First, the mental state descriptor, defined as the correct alternative, was scored as "1," and all other answers as "0" for the child and adult RMET. (See Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a , 2001b .) The average was calculated after excluding "I don't know" answers (i.e., if a participant selected a mental state descriptor in 26 cases, the score was based on the sum divided by 26 to account for that tendency). Guessing would yield 25% correct.
This approach was not possible for the modified versions, which intentionally had no correct mental state descriptor. Instead, a novel method of scoring based on the raw data was used. Based on the The mental state descriptors found here reflect how those people interpret the eye stimuli. There is-we have to stress-still no correct answer. However, through the iterative process and use of the summed z-score, the ability of the test to discriminate between persons varying in their degree of autistic traits was markedly improved from a small effect size to a medium effect size. The difference is most pronounced for items where "staring" was an answer option. The ND and NT differed by up to 15%. This was detectable since we let people on the autistic spectrum chose the mental state descriptors, which differed from the selection process of Baron-Cohen et al. (2001a) . That is, our iterative process was not biased towards NTs, and it included a gradual process on which people along the entire autistic spectrum participated.
The standard version of the RMET requires that participants answer all items. As such, being unsure forces one to select the best-fitting response despite such a choice being just slightly favored over the other options. We had considered providing a ranking scale first. In other words, participants had to indicate from 1 (highest agreement) to 4 (lowest agreement) the order of the mental state descriptors.
However, we traded that consideration off against a single answer option to ensure more participants would score all items. That is, we included the option to 'opt out' by selecting "I don't know." That is to say, we offered an alternative to guessing (Dolnicar & Grün, 2014 ).
We found a higher prevalence of "I don't know" responses among people with autism and the ND group compared to the NT group.
We think this tendency is due to perceived difficulty rather than motivation. Firstly, the "I don't know" responses were not clustered toward the end of a participant's responses. Secondly, the clarity scoring also indicated that the higher the autistic traits, the less clear the stimuli were perceived. Thirdly, when offering new mental state descriptors, the "I don't know" responses dropped. when using very short stimulus exposure and no time limit to respond. Tracy et al. (2011) found similarly fast and accurate responses among children and adolescents with or without a diagnosis of ASD. Here, we imposed no incentives, points, or time pressure. We were genuinely interested in how people perceived the stimuli. Under optimal conditions and given enough cognitive resources, performance of people with autism can be similar to that of NTs (See, for example, Harms et al. 2010.) For example, in the RMET, additional cognitive effort spent, as seen in longer response times, yielded no performance difference (Miu et al., 2012 ) . By offering the option of "I don't know" we already found a reduced group difference.
Negativity bias
The modified RMET yielded a very specific bias-a negativity bias.
There was a preference for negative mental state descriptors among the ND and ASD groups. This might be due to a more pessimistic view of the world. Indeed, there is a high prevalence of depression among people with autism (Ghaziuddin, GHaziuddin, & Greden, 2002) . It remains to be seen whether this bias is unique for autism or overlaps with depression or schizophrenia (Leppänen, 2006; Trémeau, 2006) .
Tasks that measure bias can tell us more about the processing strategy. Such tasks may also allow testing recent computational models of autism. Van de Cruys et al. (2014) Neurodiverse people may also have a less positive worldview. For people with autism, this negative worldview may come from the often frustrating unpredictability experienced in social situations (i.e., they often err and prefer to avoid such experience subsequently) (van de Cruys et al., 2014) . Indeed, we found that more NDs and people with autism than NTs preferred not to rate some of the RMET stimuli.
Social situations are complex situations requiring a lot of cognitive effort, especially if there is a lack of experience. But this is a vicious circle for people with autism. The prediction errors they make due to overweighting of sensory information and too little influence of experience (or prior worldview) is frustrating rather than rewarding (made the correct prediction). Instead of increasing the experience and hence reducing the prediction error, they chose to avoid exposure to social situations. This decision, in turn, ensures a steady arousal when again exposed to social situations. Dalton et al. (2005) found that people with autism were aroused by looking at faces, but this arousal had a negative valence, seen as hypoactivation in the amygdala. Thus, the pressure felt to have to look at a face and judge what it expresses is not preferred. Here, this negative attitude toward looking at faces was measured and quantified. It is not a failure in emotion processing capabilities; it is a bias in choosing more negative attributes, especially staring in the ND group. Responding with staring may express an avoidance behavior (i.e., not long looking at the eyes).
Conclusion
Our Internet survey yielded a robust difference among neurodiverse and neurotypical persons in the interpretation of eyes. This robust difference is based on studying a large population and avoiding dichotomization of subjects into typical developing (healthy) humans and people with autism. That is, the score difference is a continuous measurement of autistic-like traits. The modified RMET distinguishes better between people with autism and people scoring high on neurodiverse and neurotypical traits, respectively. Further,
